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CASE COMMENT
ERISA - NIETO v. ECKER: THE PROPRIETY OF NON-FIDUCIARY LIABILITY
UNDER SECTION 409
Since Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, I non-fiduciaries have been lia-
ble under section 409(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 19742 (ERISA) for knowingly aiding and abetting a fiduciary in the
breach of a duty. In May of 1988, however, the unquestioned acceptance
of non-fiduciary liability under ERISA came to a grinding halt. In Nieto v.
Ecker,3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to recognize section
409(a) liability for assisting in a fiduciary breach. The Nieto court argued
that courts accepting Freund "uncritically adopted [its] reasoning,"
'4
which ignored the "plain meaning" of section 409(a)5 and misread
ERISA's legislative history. In sharp contrast to Freund, the Nieto court
found no support for the proposition that ERISA's legislative history
called for a section 409(a) cause of action against non-fiduciaries. 6 How-
ever, Nieto did leave open the possibility of recovery under section 502 of
ERISA.
7
If a majority of the courts accept Nieto, plan participants and benefi-
ciaries will no longer be able to rely on section 409(a) as a means of
recovery from non-fiduciaries who misappropriate plan funds. As a re-
sult, ERISA's purpose of protecting "the interests of participants in em-
ployee benefit plans and their beneficiaries" 8 would be circumvented
unless the courts accept an alternate theory of recovery. This Comment
will explore the Nieto decision and its potential impact on the interpreta-
1 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
2 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). Section 409(a) of ERISA provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibili-
ties, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally
liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and
to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of
assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary. A fiduciary
may also be removed for a violation of section 1111 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982).
3 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988). See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
4 Id. at 871.
5 Id. ("The plain language of section 409(a) limits its coverage to fiduciaries, and nothing in
the statute provides any support for holding others liable under that section.").
6 Id. at 872.
7 The Ninth Circuit remanded on the basis that plaintiffs stated a claim for relief under §§ 406
and 502 of ERISA. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. Section 406 prohibits certain trans-
actions with parties in interest. 29 U.S.C. § 1106. Frommer met the ERISA § 3(14)(B) definition of
"party in interest" because he provided services to the Funds. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B). If Frommer
violated § 406, plaintiffs would be entitled to equitable relief under § 502. Section 502 expressly
authorizes such relief to redress violations of either subchapter 1 of ERISA, including § 406, or the
terms of the pension plan. The court interpreted "equitable relief" within § 502 to encompass state
law remedies "including the issuance of an injunction or the imposition of a constructive trust."
845 F.2d at 874. The court also noted that in contrast to § 409, § 502 is not limited to fiduciaries
and therefore an ERISA violation by a non-fiduciary would fall within its scope.
8 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
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tion of sections 409(a) and 502. Part I provides a brief background of the
relevant provisions of ERISA. Part II analyzes the reasoning of Freund
and Nieto and describes the circumstances surrounding the two cases.
Part III argues that the Nieto court was correct in ruling that section
409(a) does not provide for non-fiduciary liability. Part IV suggests that,
consistent with ERISA's purpose and structure, a constructive trust pro-
vides an authorized equitable remedy under section 502, and therefore
obviates the necessity of non-fiduciary liability.
I. Background and Relevant Sections of ERISA
Prior to the enactment of ERISA in 1974, federal regulation of the
private pension system was governed by the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act.9 The Disclosure Act indirectly controlled pension plans
by awarding tax benefits' 0 to those plans that qualified under specific
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code."! Since the Act sanctioned vio-
lations of the Internal Revenue Code provisions only by withdrawing a
plan's tax-exempt status, enforcement of the Act primarily affected the
plan's intended beneficiaries. This adverse impact frustrated the pur-
pose behind pension plans and Congress eventually questioned the Act's
effectiveness. 12
In order to effectively govern the rapidly expanding pension indus-
try,' 3 Congress passed ERISA in 1974 as a "comprehensive remedial
statute designed to 'protect ... the interests of participants in employee
9 Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958), repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 § 11 l(a)(1), 88 Stat. 829, 851. The drafters of ERISA recognized the need for a comprehen-
sive federal statute covering pension plans, in part because the Disclosure Act was "wholly lacking in
substantive fiduciary standards." S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4841. See generally Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1975).
10 Plans that qualified under the Internal Revenue Code were granted the following tax benefits:
1) the employer could deduct his contributions to the plan; and 2) the employee was not taxed on
his share of the employer's contributions or on the investment income those contributions gener-
ated until he actually received benefits upon retirement or plan termination. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a),
402(a), 404(a), 501(a) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a), 404(a), 501(a), (c)22 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
11 In order to qualify for a tax exemption, a pension plan had to be written, permanent, for the
exclusive benefit of covered employees, and could not discriminate in favor of highly-paid employ-
ees. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 401(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See, e.g.,
Winger's Dept. Store, Inc., 82 T.C. 869 (1984) (plan which made loans to the employer's business
was not operated for the "exclusive benefit of the employees"); Wisconsin Nipple & Fabricating
Corp. v. Commissioner, 581 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1978) (plan discriminated where five of six covered
employees, out of 20 full-time employees, were highly compensated).
12 See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4639, 4890. Prior to the enactment of ERISA, it appeared that pensions were subject to a
wide variety of abuses. For example, the employer could either terminate the plan at any time or fire
his workers prior to vesting. In either case, workers could suffer large capital losses. In addition, the
long-term nature and complexity of pension contracts gave rise to informational problems and diffi-
culty in enforcing the agreements in court. These problems led Ralph Nader and Kate Blackwell to
conclude that "[plensions are no more certain than horseraces." R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, YOU
AND YOUR PENSION 2 (1973).
13 At the end of 1973, the total assets of private uninsured pension plans exceeded 130 billion
dollars. See CCH Pension Plan Guide No. 328 at 5-6 (Nov. 22, 1974). In addition, more than 35
million employees were covered by the private pension system. See Hearings on S.4 & S.75 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 174 (1973).
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benefit plans and their beneficiaries.' "14 Consistent with its stated pur-
pose, the text of ERISA and its legislative history are "replete with refer-
ences to fiduciary obligations."' 15 ERISA explicitly defines those persons
considered fiduciaries in section 3(21) (a),16 sets forth their duties in sec-
tion 404,17 and provides remedies for the breach of those duties in sec-
tions 409(a) and 502.18 Despite its complex remedial scheme, however,
ERISA makes "no mention of obligations for non-fiduciaries.' 19 Accord-
ingly, courts that have imposed non-fiduciary liability have done so by
going beyond the plain language of the statute.
II. Development of the Controversy
Freund initiated the idea of non-fiduciary liability under ERISA for
assisting in the breach of a fiduciary duty and has become the "seminal
case in this area." 20 The court in Freund established that non-fiduciaries
who knowingly assist fiduciaries in breaching their duties may be person-
ally liable under section 409(a) to make good any losses suffered by the
plan. Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit in Nieto v. Ecker held that sec-
tion 409(a) did not authorize non-fiduciary liability.21 Thus, the Nieto de-
cision conflicts with all previous decisions which have followed Freund.
14 Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453,457 (10th Cir. 1978) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)). The regula-
tory effectiveness of ERISA has been questioned however. See Ippolito, A Study of the Regulatory Eflect
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 31 J. L. & ECON. 85 (1988).
15 Schwartz, Non-fiduciary Liability Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 69 MARq. L.
REV. 561, 562 (1986). See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text for the ERISA sections referring
to fiduciary obligations.
16 A person is a "fiduciary" to the extent "(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discre-
tionary control respecting management of such plan or ... its assets, (ii) he renders investment
advice for a fee or other compensation... or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(a).
17 Section 404 requires a fiduciary to act for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to par-
ticipants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable administrative expenses. In dispensing
with these dutis, a fiduciary is also required to act in the manner of a prudent man in a like capacity.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
18 See supra note 2 for the text of § 409(a). Under § 502,
[a] civil action may be brought ....
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief
under section 1109 [409] of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan ....
29 U.S.C. § 1132.
19 Schwartz, supra note 15, at 562-63.
20 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 871. See, e.g., Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988);
Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220-21"(2d Cir. 1987); Fink v. National
Say. and Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1078 (7th
Cir. 1982); Fremont v. McGraw-Edison Co., 606 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951
(1980); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1986); Donovan v.
Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Nev. 1984); Donovan v. Bryans, 566 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa.
1983); McDougall v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Il1. 1982).
21 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873.
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A. The Leading Case: Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank
In Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 22 trustees of an ERISA plan 23
loaned virtually all of the assets of the plan back to sponsoring compa-
nies in exchange for unsecured promissory notes. The lack of security
on the notes presented significant risks for the plan, and the interest
rates paid on the notes did not adequately compensate for these risks. As
a result, the invested plan assets were lost and the beneficiaries brought
suit.
2 4
In its analysis, the Freund court first determined that the trustees of
the plan were in breach of various ERISA sections concerning fiduciary
responsibilities. 25 Next, the court reasoned that because Congress in-
tended ERISA to federalize the common law of trusts, traditional princi-
ples of trust law should apply to ERISA. 26 The law of trusts holds non-
.fiduciaries liable for assisting a fiduciary in breaching his duties. 27 The
beneficiary, as the equitable owner of trust assets, has a cause of action
against anyone who interferes with those assets. 28 Based on this reason-
22 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
23 The plan in Freund was "a system of employer and employee contributions to a trusteed fund,
with contributions and investment earnings of the fund's assets being allocated to individual ac-
counts." Id. at 634. This plan "by 'the express terms' of the Plan document was established to
provide retirement income to employees of the sponsoring companies and this fact alone establishes
ERISA coverage." Id.
24 Id. at 636.
25 The court held that the trustees, as fiduciaries, violated the duty of prudence imposed by
§ 404(a)(1) (A), (B) of ERISA because they permitted the plan's assets to be loaned back to the com-
panies who sponsored the plan; that by loaning the assets back to the sponsoring companies, the
trustees failed to diversify the investment of the plan as required by § 404(a)(1)(C) of ERISA; and
that since each of the sponsoring companies was a "party in interest" (because each company had
employees who were participants in the plan), the trustees violated § 406(a) of ERISA which pros-
cribes transactions between plan and parties in interest. Id. at 639.
26 Id. at 635.
27 Id. at 641-42. The court stated:
While only fiduciaries can violate the fiduciary responsibility provisions of Title I of ERISA,
it does not follow from that fact that relief may be awarded only against the breaching
fiduciaries. In view of the expressed Congressional intent in enacting ERISA "to make
applicable the law of trusts," the Court is fully empowered to award the relief available in
traditional trust law against non-fiduciaries who knowingly participate, either directly or
through an agent, in a breach of trust.
Under traditional principles of trust law a third party who assisted a trustee in commit-
ting a breach of trust could be held liable in an action brought by the beneficiary.
The court assumed, however, that every principle from the traditional law of trusts can freely be
incorporated into ERISA, and thus can transform a state cause of action into a federal one. For
further analysis of Freund's rationale, see infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
28 Id. at 642. The court, quoting G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 901 (2d ed.
rev. 1978), stated:
Just as every owner of a legal interest has the right that others shall not, without lawful
excuse, interfere with his possession or enjoyment of the property or injuriously affect its
value, so the cestui, as an equitable owner in the trust res, has the right that third persons
shall not knowingly join with the trustee in a breach of trust .... The wrong of participation
in a breach of trust is divided into two elements, namely (1) an act or omission which fur-
thers or completes the breach of trust by the trustee; and (2) knowledge at the time that the
transaction amounted to a breach of trust, or the legal equivalent of such knowledge.
See Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971) (pre-ERISA case). Knowledge of the
breach is a necessary element for liability under traditional trust law. Freund appeared to accept
knowledge (or its legal equivalent) as a requisite for liability but did not really address the question.
The court noted that it "need not reach the question whether, absent direct knowledge that a breach
was occurring, the non-fiduciary sellers were on notice of such facts about a potential breach that
[Vol. 64:271
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ing, the court concluded that the sponsoring companies were personally
liable under section 409(a) of ERISA for knowingly participating in the
fiduciary's breach of duty.29
B. The New Alternative: Nieto v. Ecker
In contrast to Freund, the court in Nieto v. Ecker30 held that section
409(a) does not authorize non-fiduciary liability.31 The plaintiffs in Nieto
were members of labor unions which had entered into agreements with
various associations of employers to establish trust funds ("the Funds")
to be financed by mandatory employer contributions.3 2 An attorney,
Frommer, was retained by a group of multi-employer pension plans to
collect delinquent contributions from these employers. The plaintiffs
sued Frommer for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, alleging that he
"had repeatedly failed to prosecute lawsuits to collect delinquent contri-
butions and had been paid attorney's fees for services that he did not
render."3
3
The plaintiffs first argued that Frommer was a fiduciary of the Funds
within the meaning of ERISA and was, therefore, subject to all the duties
and liabilities imposed on fiduciaries.3 4 The court held that Frommer, as
an independent attorney, was not a fiduciary under ERISA.3 5 The plain-
tiffs then argued that even if Frommer was not a fiduciary, he could still
be held liable under ERISA section 409(a) as one who conspired and
acted with fiduciaries in the breach of their fiduciary duties.3 6 Ruling
against the previous decisions, the court held that only fiduciaries as de-
fined by ERISA may be sued under section 409(a).3 7 The court intimated
that Freund is fundamentally flawed and that courts accepting it have
done so uncritically.
38
The Nieto court did not hold Frommer liable as a non-fiduciary
under section 409(a). However, the court did suggest that he might be
they had a duty to inquire further to determine whether the breach was occurring." Freund, 485 F.
Supp. at 642 n.6.
29 Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 642.
30 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988).
31 Id. at 873.
32 Id. at 870. The Funds are multiemployer plans subject to ERISA, and the plaintiffs are, by
virtue of their membership in the unions, participants in the funds.
33 Id. The plaintiffs joined the Funds and their trustees as defendants in federal district court.
The district court dismissed a pendent state claim and the ERISA claims against Frommer. The
plaintiffs have appealed only the dismissal of the ERISA claims against Frommer. Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 871. The Ninth Circuit resolved this issue in Yeseta v. Bairnes, 837 F.2d 380, 385 (9th
Cir. 1988) which held that "an attorney rendering professional services to a plan is not a fiduciary so
long as he does not exercise any authority over the plan 'in a manner other than by usual profes-
sional functions.'" Nieto, 845 F.2d at 870. The complaint in Nieto did not allege that Frommer
exercised any such authority over the Funds. Id. The Nieto court refused to expand the meaning of
fiduciary past the limits set by Yeseta, and Frommer, therefore, was not held to be a fiduciary.
36 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 871.
37 The court in Nieto noted that the plain language of the section limits its coverage to fiducia-
ries. Id. at 873. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text for the analysis of the plain language
argument.
38 Id. at 871.
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liable as a "party in interest" under sections 406(a)(1) and 408(b).3 9 The
court added that if the non-fiduciary could be found liable under these
sections, appropriate equitable relief would be available under section
502(a)(3).
40
III. Analysis of the Nieto Decision
The Nieto court rejected Freund and its progeny for a number of rea-
sons. First, the Freund court ignored the "plain meaning" of section
409. 4 1 Second, the Freund court relied on a dubious interpretation of
one Senator's statement that Congress intended ERISA to incorporate
"the complete body of state trust law." 42 Third, the Supreme Court es-
tablished a presumption that ERISA was not intended to be supple-
mented by state law causes of action because ERISA is complex and
complete.43 Fourth, and finally, the non-fiduciary liability was a "cause
of action" and not a "remedy" which could be properly fashioned within
the limits of ERISA.
44
A. The Plain Language Argument
The Nieto court argued that the plain language of section 409(a)45
limits its application to "fiduciaries" and that there is no room for non-
fiduciary liability under this section. 46 The statute clearly states that only
those persons who are defined as "fiduciaries" in the other sections of
ERISA should be held "personally liable."'47 This interpretation is in-
sharp contrast to Freund, which held that aiding and abetting in a fiduci-
ary breach could render a non-fiduciary liable under section 409(a).48
Despite Judge Wiggins' arguments in the Nieto concurrence, 49 the
Nieto court correctly concluded that section 409(a) provides a remedy
39 Because Frommer, as an attorney, provided services to the fund, he was a "party in interest"
under ERISA § 3(14)(B). Section 406 of ERISA prohibits certain transactions between ERISA plans
and their parties in interest. As the Nieto court noted, "[s]ome of the allegations in the complaint, if
true, establish that Frommer participated in such 'prohibited transactions' with the Funds by receiv-
ing excessive compensation for legal services, obtaining a loan from the Funds, and engaging in
similar activities in violation of ERISA §§ 406(a)(1), 408(b)." Id. at 873.
40 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873. See also McDougall v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 596, 598-99 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (section 502(a)(3) permits a court to order equitable relief against a party in interest who
engages in a prohibited transaction).
41 See infra text accompanying notes 45-52.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 53-66.
43 Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); see infra text accompanying
notes 67-77.
44 See infra text accompanying notes 78-91.
45 Section 409(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), applies to "[a]ny person who is a fiduciary."
(Emphasis added).
46 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 872. The court stated: "Congress has provided a remedy against fiduciaries
alone in section 409(a) and we see no basis for reading into that section a remedy against non-
fiduciaries as well." Id.
47 Id. at 871.
48 Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 641-42.
49 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 874 (Wiggins, J., concurring). The concurring opinion in Nieto supported
the reasoning in Freund. Judge Wiggins argued that § 409(a) should not be read in isolation, but
rather should be read in relation to ERISA's other sections (namely § 502), and in relation to the
general purposes behind ERISA as a whole. Id. at 875. According to judge Wiggins, because § 502
allows for "other equitable or remedial relief" and because the overall goal of ERISA is to provide
effective remedies to plan beneficiaries, § 409(a) should be given as broad a construction as possible.
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only against fiduciaries. 50 Nowhere in 409(a) is there any suggestion that
anyone other than a breaching fiduciary should be held personally liable
to the plan. 51 As Judge Wiggins suggested, the justification for non-fidu-
ciary liability under section 409(a) would have to arise, if at all, from
some source other than the plain language of ERISA.52 In the absence of
some otherjustification, the Nieto court must have correctly held that sec-
tion 409(a) applies only to "fiduciaries."
B. Legislative Intent
By carefully crafting the provisions of ERISA, Congress hoped that
"It]he uniformity of decision which the Act is designed to fasten [would]
help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the legality of
proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying state
laws." s5 3 Unfortunately, as evidenced by the circuit conflict, the courts
have not carried congressional hopes to fruition. In Nieto, the court re-
lied primarily on the "plain language" of section 409 in determining the
issue before it, 54 and apparently felt no need to delve beneath the sur-
face of the statute.55 Such an analysis is deceptively simple, however,
because several courts have imposed liability on non-fiduciaries under
section 409(a).56 These courts adopted the reasoning developed in
Freund, which based its holding on the legislative history. To determine
whether there is a sound basis for Freund's rationale, therefore, one must
examine ERISA's legislative history.
Central to the Freund court's argument is a statement made during
congressional debate on ERISA by Senator Williams, the chairman of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and one of the sponsors
of ERISA. While describing the goals of the fiduciary liability provisions
of ERISA, Senator Williams commented:
The objectives of these provisions are to make applicable the law of
trusts; to prohibit exculpatory clauses that have often been used in
this field; to establish uniform fiduciary standards to prevent transac-
Otherwise, ERISA would provide less protection than had been available under state law and the
purpose of ERISA would be frustrated. McDougall v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 596,7599 (W.D. Ill. 1982)
("ERISA should not be read so narrowly as to defeat these principles of the common law of trusts").
This, coupled with the argument that the federal courts are empowered to "fashion a body of federal
common law" to effectuate the ends of ERISA (Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 156 (1985); Shaw v. Kruidenier, 470 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (S.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 307
(8th Cir. 1980)), led Judge Wiggins to conclude that § 409(a) liability was not meant to be limited
solely to fiduciaries. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 875.
50 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 874.
51 See supra note 2.
52 See supra note 49.
53 S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMIN. NEws 4639,
4865.
54 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 871. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
55 Because Freund and the cases following it referred to the legislative history of ERISA as the
rationale for incorporating a state law cause of action into § 409, the Nieto court did consider the
legislative history. But the court felt that § 409 was clear on its face and that "legislative history is
irrelevant to the construction of an unambiguous statute." Id. at 872 n.2.
56 See, e.g., Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988); Lowen v. Tower Asset
Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220-21 (2d Cir. 1987); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1078
(7th Cir. 1982).
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tions which dissipate or endanger plan assets; and to provide effective
remedies for breaches of trust.
57
The court in Nieto noted this excerpt from ERISA's legislative history and
concluded that "it provides no basis for departing from the plain mean-
ing of the statute." 58 The court reasoned that:
Freund and the cases following it have built very much on very little.
As we read Senator Williams' statement, it merely directs the courts to
rely on state law principles in adjudicating claims otherwise within the
scope of the Act.... [I]t provides no support for the incorporation of
state law causes of action as a supplement to the explicit provisions of
ERISA.5 9
The legislative history of ERISA does not refer to the obligations or stan-
dards of behavior required of non-fiduciaries.
Freund found support for non-fiduciary liability under section 409
not from the legislative history but from the traditional law of trusts. 60
The Freund court attempted to weave together ERISA and the common
law of trusts with the comment made by Senator Williams. 6' From this
statement, the Freund court made a leap of faith and presumed that Con-
gress intended "to federalize the common law of trusts" in enacting
ERISA. 62 Contrary to Freund's assumption, the Nieto court explained that
making "applicable the law of trusts" is not the same thing as federaliz-
ing the common law of trusts.63 Congress decided to create ERISA be-
57 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 5186
(statement of Sen. Williams).
58 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 871. Nieto's analysis of the Freund opinion begins with the implicit premise
that to depart from the plain meaning of a federal statute, a court must first provide a basis. The
Nieto court noted that "[ajs courts of limited jurisdiction, our power to adjudicate claims is limited to
that granted by Congress, and such grants are not to be lightly inferred." Id. at 871. Thus, the court
felt that it was presumed to lack jurisdiction under § 409 unless affirmatively shown to the contrary.
To act otherwise would unconstitutionally usurp judicial power from the states by cloaking a state
law cause of action in federal garb.
59 Id. at 872.
60 Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 641-42. The court in Freund used the legislative history of ERISA as a
bridge to connect the federal courts with the common law of trusts. But § 409 and the common law
of trusts directly contradict one other: Section 409 explicitly requires that one be a fiduciary to be
personally liable for a fiduciary breach while the common law of trusts allows liability to attach to
non-fiduciaries who were involved in that breach. ERISA's legislative history does not sustain
Freund's complete disregard of the clear language of § 409. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying
text.
61 Id. at 635.
62 Id. The Freund court focused on the beginning of Senator Williams' statement and apparently
ignored the rest of it. For Senator Williams' concern with prohibiting exculpatory clauses which he
expressed during the floor debate on ERISA proves that Congress did not intend to federalize the
common law of trusts. The prohibition against exculpation from liability for breach of trust
originates in ERISA as compared with the often-present exculpatory provisions in trust instruments
permitted under the common law of trusts. Thus, the very speech by Senator Williams upon which
Freund bases its rationale undermines the holding of Freund.
63 The "fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to these fiduci-
aries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts." S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4639, 4865 (emphasis added). As the
Nieto court notes, this statement from the legislative history "does not support the broader proposi-
tion that ERISA meant to adopt the entire body of stated trust law lock, stock and barrel." Nieto, 845
F.2d at 872 n.2.
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cause the law of trusts was inadequate and differed from state to state.64
As the legislative history reveals, "[t]he principles of fiduciary conduct
are adopted from existing trust law, but with modifications appropriate for
employee benefit plans." 65 The Nieto court correctly argued that in this
context, Senator Williams' statement takes on a different meaning than
the Freund court gave it.
Congress was influenced by existing trust law when it wrote ERISA
and tailored certain of its principles to fit pension plans, but evidently it
did not intend the courts to revert to traditional trust law to create causes
of action not found in the explicit terms of ERISA. It was Senator Wil-
liams himself who, while speaking of the necessity for ERISA, stated that
"neither existing State or Federal law has been effective in preventing or
correcting many [pension plan] abuses." 66 It appears that whatever Con-
gress found applicable in traditional trust law, Congress itself "federal-
ized" and incorporated into ERISA. Therefore, the Nieto court correctly
found that the legislative intent of ERISA offers no justification for non-
fiduciary liability under section 409(a).
C. Presumption Against Supplementation
The fact that ERISA is such a carefully integrated system of remedies
provided the Nieto court with a strong argument that Congress did not
intend to authorize other remedies which it simply forgot to incorpo-
rate.67 The Nieto court recognized that " 'where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading
64 As the background section of the House report reveals, "[i]n the absence of adequate federal
standards, the participant is left to rely on the traditional equitable remedies of the common law of
trusts." H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
4639, 4643.
65 IL at 4651 (emphasis added). As Congress noted in its conference report, "reliance on con-
ventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan participants and
beneficiaries. This is because trust law had developed in the context of testamentary and inter vivos
trusts." S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
4639, 4865. Therefore, rather than simply federalizing the traditional law of trusts, Congress found
it necessary to select certain principles out of the law of trusts and then modify these principles
because "the typical employee benefit plan.., is quite different from the testamentary trust both in
purpose and in nature." Id. at 4865.
66 Id. at 5186. Senator Williams also stressed that "with the narrow exceptions specified in the
bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of... [ERISA] ... are intended to preempt the field
for Federal regulation[]." Id. at 5188.
67 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 872. The Nieto majority based this reasoning upon the United States
Supreme Court case of Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985), in which the
Supreme Court held against providing extra-contractual damages which were not provided by the
language of ERISA itself. The Russell Court reasoned: "The six carefully integrated civil enforce-
ment provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted ... provide strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly."
Id. at 146. As the Court noted, "where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies,
a court must be chary of reading others into it." Id. at 147 (quoting Transamerican Mortgage Advi-
sors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
Of Russell, the Nieto majority said: "This conclusion was based on the Court's view of ERISA as
a carefully crafted 'comprehensive and reticulated statute.'" Id. In other words, the Supreme Court
had determined that ERISA's remedial scheme was so comprehensive and well thought out that it
was not meant to be supplemented by other law except where specifically provided by the statute.
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others into it.' "68 ERISA expressly sets out those persons who shall be
defined as "fiduciaries" under the statute.69 The statute then details the
duties of these fiduciaries70 and then, in section 409(a), provides a rem-
edy against fiduciaries who breach their duty.71 Reading these fiduciary
sections together, the rational conclusion must be that Congress would
not indiscriminately use the word "fiduciary" after having taken so much
trouble to define it.
Furthermore, ERISA covers more than simply wrongs committed by
fiduciaries. For example, ERISA defines "parties in interest" 72 and pro-
vides remedies against these persons for partaking in prohibited transac-
tions.73 Thus, one may reasonably conclude that ERISA's remedial
sections were meant to apply only to those persons to whom each partic-
ular section applied. The Nieto court correctly presumed that Congress
did not simply forget to provide a remedy against non-fiduciaries.
74
Accordingly, it is possible within the scheme of ERISA to reach as-
sets in the hands of persons other than fiduciaries without the necessity
of imposing non-fiduciary liability under section 409(a). 75 Furthermore,
even if the federal courts are empowered to formulate a body of federal
common law to effectuate the ends of ERISA,76 this power must be lim-
ited to fashioning such "other equitable and remedial relief" as is au-
thorized by the statute, rather than fashioning new causes of action
against non-fiduciaries who take possession of plan assets.
77
D. The Definition of "Remedies"
ERISA sections 502 and 409, which authorize "other equitable and
remedial relief," were intended to provide plan beneficiaries and partici-
pants with those equitable remedies available under state law only where
they are necessary to adjudicate claims otherwise within the scope of
68 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 872 (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147
(1985)).
69 See supra note 16.
70 See supra note 17.
71 See supra note 2.
72 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1982).
73 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a), (c) (1982).
74 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 872.
75 Using a constructive trust, a court could reach plan assets, or the value for which they are
purchased, without actually imposing liability upon a non-fiduciary who has possession of the assets.
See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
76 This power would be similar to the courts' power to fashion a body of federal common law
under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 156 (1985); Shaw v. Kruidenier, 470 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
77 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 872 n.2. The federal courts have considerable power to fashion a federal
common law under the Labor Management Relations Act because that Act is not, nor was it intended
to be, as complete as ERISA and there is little statutory federal law. The Labor Management Rela-
tions Act was intended to federalize the law of labor management relations but did not intend to
codify such law. Thus, "[w]here ... claims by participants or beneficiaries do not involve application
of the substantive requirements of this legislation, they may be brought in either state or federal
courts of competent jurisdiction." 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams).
ERISA, however, was intended to both federalize and codify the law of pensions. As a result, the
statute is much more comprehensive and the need for federal common law is considerably less.
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ERISA. 78 These sections provide no support for the incorporation of
state law causes of action.79 Nonetheless, Freund and the cases following
it reasoned that the words "equitable or remedial relief" should be
broadly construed so as to encompass a cause of action against non-fidu-
ciaries under section 409(a), thus providing "effective remedies" for plan
participants and beneficiaries.8 0
As Nieto illustrated, this broad construction has certain flaws. If
courts find non-fiduciaries liable for aiding and abetting in a fiduciary
breach and hold them personally accountable to the fund for any lost
proceeds, courts will have fashioned more than an "equitable remedy."
In fact, they will have created a cause of action against the non-fiduciary
for "aiding and abetting" a breach of fiduciary duty. Such a cause of
action does not exist within the language of ERISA.8 1 To allow the
words "other equitable or remedial relief" to encompass causes of action
is to give them an unjustifiably expansive interpretation.
Nieto correctly distinguished an equitable remedy, which may be pro-
vided under section 502, from a cause of action, which the court held
should not be imposed unless ERISA expressly provides for it.82 The
distinction between "remedy" and "cause of action" is apparent from the
court's willingness to incorporate common law trust remedies into
ERISA, but not common law trust causes of action. For example, the
Nieto court rejected the argument made by the Secretary of Labor in his
amicus brief that prior cases had incorporated common law trust causes
of action into ERISA.83 The Nieto court ruled that while Donovan v. Maz-
zola 84 held that Congress intended courts to "draw on principles of tradi-
tional trust law" 85 in formulating remedies, it did not support the "far
broader proposition.., that the common law of trusts supplies a federal
cause of action where the statute itself provides none."86 Accordingly, the
Nieto court did not incorporate a cause of action against non-fiduciaries
even though such a cause of action was authorized by the common law of
78 Section 409(a) provides that a breaching fiduciary "shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate." See supra note 2 (emphasis added). Section
502(3)(b) provides that participants and beneficiaries may "obtain other appropriate equitable relief."
See supra note 18 (emphasis added). Therefore, the very most that these sections authorize is "other
equitable or remedial relief," with § 502 actually limited to only "equitable relief."
79 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 872.
80 Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 641-42 (W.D. Wis. 1979); McDougall v.
Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 596, 598 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("In the absence of clear legislative history to
the contrary, we can only assume that the broad, remedial enforcement authority... is intended to
effectuate the broad and remedial purposes of ERISA.").
81 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 871. The Court in Russell also recognized that Congress clearly did not
intend to authorize additional legal remedies (such as a cause of action against non-fiduciaries)
under ERISA. The Court pointed to the fact that "an early version of the statute contained a provi-
sion for 'legal or equitable' relief... [but] [i]n the bill passed by the House of Representatives and
ultimately adopted by the Conference Committee the reference to legal relief was deleted." Massa-
chusetts Mut. Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1985).
82 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 872.
83 Id.
84 716 F.2d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1983).
85 Id. at 1231, 1235.
86 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 872 (emphasis added).
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trusts. 8 7 However, the court did suggest the imposition of a common law
trust remedy (constructive trust) upon property improperly received by
the non-fiduciary. 88
Traditionally, the concept of using a constructive trust to trace assets
into the hands of third parties was considered an equitable remedy.89 A
constructive trust differs from a legal cause of action for aiding and abet-
ting. In an action for aiding and abetting, the non-fiduciary is actually
found liable for having committed a wrong and, as such, must pay the
damages proximately caused.90 In a tracing of assets through a construc-
tive trust, however, a court would not specifically find that the non-fiduci-
ary committed a wrong.91 Rather, the court simply issues an order that
the assets, wherever they may be, belong to the fund and must be re-
turned. The court does not find the non-fiduciary guilty of any wrongdo-
ing nor does it hold the non-fiduciary personally liable. As a result, a
constructive trust is not only equitable, where aiding and abetting is
legal; a constructive trust is also a remedy, where aiding and abetting is a
cause of action.
IV. Constructive Trust as Authorized Equitable Relief
Freund and its progeny insisted that non-fiduciary liability under sec-
tion 409(a) was necessary to provide effective remedies under ERISA. 92
Nieto, however, suggested that other remedies available within the com-
plex scheme of ERISA might serve this purpose in place of non-fiduciary
liability.93 One of the court's suggestions, a constructive trust, could be
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 280 (1959) provides: "The trustee can maintain such
actions at law or suits in equity or other proceedings against a third party as he could maintain if he
held that trust property free of trust." See generally G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 955 (2d ed. rev. 1978).
88 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 874.
89 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (2d ed. rev. 1978).
90 The Freund court stated:
Under traditional principles of trust law a third party who assisted a trustee in commit-
ting a breach of trust could be held liable in an action brought by the beneficiary. More-
over, the trustee and the third party could be joined in a suit for the recovery of the value of
the trust property lost on account of the breach.
Freund, 485 F. Supp. at 642 (citing G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 868 (2d ed. rev.
1978)).
91 Although a finding of wrongdoing on the part of the non-fiduciary would not be required, a
beneficiary seeking the imposition of a constructive trust may have to show that the non-fiduciary
was not a bona fide purchaser. Bona fide purchasers take trust assets free ofany claim by the trust's
beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 284 (1959). According to its definition, a
person would not be considered a "bona fide purchaser" if he either had notice of the breach of trust
or failed to give value.
A third party [non-fiduciary] has notice of the breach [of trust] not only when he knows of
the breach [of trust], but also when he should know of it; that is when he knows facts which
under the circumstances would lead a reasonably intelligent and diligent person to inquire
whether the trustee is a trustee and whether he is committing a breach of trust ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 297 comment a (1959). In addition, at common law, the re-
ceipt of trust assets by a third party resulting from a fiduciary breach constituted sufficient participa-
tion for purposes of establishing knowing participation. As a result, a non-fiduciary who aided and
abetted a fiduciary in a breach of trust would clearly have sufficient notice, and would therefore not
be considered a bona fide purchaser.
92 See, e.g., McDougall v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 596, 598 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
93 Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873.
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used to achieve the same ends as non-fiduciary liability without violating
either the language or the intent of ERISA.94
The legislative history of ERISA indicates that the "other equitable
relief" provided for in section 502 may be derived from state trust law
principles. In the House Conference Report, Senator Williams empha-
sized that remedies should be fashioned for ERISA violations in the same
way that they are formulated under section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act.95 An overwhelming number of courts have held that
section 301 "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law" 96
by "looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that
will effectuate that policy."'97 Given the broad language of section 502
and the guidance provided by its legislative history, it appears that Con-
gress intended to grant the courts wide-ranging powers to impose equi-
table relief that would carry out the Act's intended purpose-to "protect
... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their bene-
ficiaries." 98 Accordingly, while ERISA would not authorize a direct cause
of action against a non-fiduciary, 99 courts could impose the state law
remedy of constructive trust.100
A court could not impose a constructive trust, however, in all cases
where a non-fiduciary misappropriated funds. Under section 502, equi-
table relief would only be available if the court found a violation of an-
other section of ERISA or the terms of the plan. 101 For example, in
Nieto, the court ruled that section 502 would apply only if the district
court, on remand, found that the non-fiduciary party in interest had vio-
lated section 406.102 Similarly, in Freund, the fiduciary's violation of sec-
tion 409 would trigger the application of section 502. In either case,
therefore, the courts could have imposed equitable relief in the form of a
constructive trust.
If a court imposed a constructive trust, it would order the non-fiduci-
ary to return the fund assets or proceeds from the sale of the assets to the
94 See infra note 104.
95 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5107. This report stated: "All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947." Id.
96 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957); see also Association of Westing-
house Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623, 625 (3d Cir. 1954), af'd on
other grounds, 348 U.S. 437 (1955); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d
376, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1953); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529, 533
(4th Cir. 1951); Hamilton Foundry & Mach. Co. v. International Molders & Foundry Workers Union,
193 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952); Shirley-Herman Co. v. Interna-
tional Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1950); Schatte v. International Alliance, 182
F.2d 158, 164 (9th Cir. 1950).
97 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
98 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
99 See supra text accompanying notes 81-91.
100 One federal district court has exercised this power in the ERISA context. In Donovan v.
Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Nev. 1984), trustees were specifically alleged to have violated
ERISA §§ 404 and 406 by making loans to non-fiduciary defendant borrowers who were contribu-
tors to the fund. In rendering judgment against the defendants, the court effectively imposed a
constructive trust by ordering the restitution of the plan funds from the non-fiduciary borrowers.
101 29 U.S.C. § 1132(3); see supra note 18.
102 Nieto, 485 F.2d at 874.
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plan. Thus, even if the non-fiduciary sold the assets to a bona fide pur-
chaser for value, a court could still compel the non-fiduciary to reconvey
the value received from the bona fide purchaser to the fund. 10 3 Because
the constructive trust would restore fund assets or the proceeds from the
sale of those assets regardless of where they might lie, a constructive




Freund and the courts which followed it were incorrect in stating that
non-fiduciary liability was necessary in order to provide effective reme-
dies under ERISA. The Nieto court correctly determined that the Freund
court and the courts following it exceeded their authority in finding that
a non-fiduciary could be liable for aiding and abetting under section
409(a). The plain language of section 409(a) provides a remedy only
against fiduciaries. Also, Congress did not intend for the courts to sup-
plement ERISA's complex scheme with state law causes of action. Fi-
nally, because a constructive trust (an equitable remedy that would be
authorized under ERISA) could be used to achieve the same ends, non-
fiduciary liability is not necessary to provide effective remedies to pen-
sion plan participants and beneficiaries. In the future, courts should fol-
low the lead of Nieto v. Ecker and abandon the misguided approach of




103 (1) Where the trustee in breach of trust transfers trust property to a person who takes
with notice of the breach of trust, the transferee can be compelled,
(a) if he has not disposed of the property, to restore it to the trust, together with the
income which he has received from the property; or
(b) if he has disposed of the property, to pay the proceeds of the sale with the income
received from the property and from the proceeds, or the amount of the proceeds with
interest thereon and with any income which he received from the property before he sold it,
or to pay the value of the property at the time of the decree with the income received from
the property ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 291 (1959). In addition, comment (e) to section 291 provides
that if the transferee with notice of the breach of trust "sells and has disposed of the proceeds or if
the proceeds cannot be reached, the beneficiary can compel him to pay the amount of the proceeds
with interest thereon, together with any income which he received from the property before he sold
it."
104 Although a constructive trust would provide an effective remedy, it would not be as effective
as a cause of action against the non-fiduciary because punitive damages could not be recovered
under a constructive trust where they might be available in a § 409(a) cause of action. See supra note
2. Nonetheless, a constructive trust would not require the courts to go beyond the plain language or
legislative intent of ERISA as in the case of a § 409(a) cause of action. See supra notes 45-66 and
accompanying text.
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